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Abstract 
Attempts at fighting the “resource curse” across the globe have produced few 
successful results. Most countries affected by a resource curse are trapped in a vicious 
circle: a transparent and accountable government structure and a democratic political 
regime – which are necessary prerequisites for avoiding the resource curse - cannot be 
built precisely because of the resource curse effect. However, cases when the 
resource curse has been avoided (although considered exceptional by some scholars) 
do offer a certain optimism when one is searching for ways to avoid the curse. 
This policy study addresses only one of the variables needing to be employed in the 
struggle against the resource curse in Azerbaijan, i.e. improved transparency and 
accountability in the use of oil resources. It suggests making a distinction between the 
concept of transparency and that related to inform public participation; and it also 
analyses methods via which to get direct public participation in the management of oil 
resources in Azerbaijan - as one of possible tools to ensure accountability and thus 
contribute to avoiding the resource curse. 
Three policy alternatives for direct public participation - namely (i) dispensing oil 
revenues directly to citizens in the form of cash payments; (ii) fiscal decentralisation of 
the administering of oil resources (through municipalities), and (iii) public hearings - are 
analysed and evaluated against specific criteria. Results show, however, that none of 
these policy alternatives, if implemented within the current political, economic and 
social framework, will produce desirable results – so extensive reforms to see an 
improving of parliamentary oversight, developing municipalities and a building of social 
trust are vital for making any one of these alternatives feasible in Azerbaijan. 
This policy paper was produced under the 2006-07 International Policy Fellowship 
program. Leyla Karimli was a member of the ‘Combating the Resource Curse’ working 
group, which was directed by Michel Ross. More details of their policy research can be 
found at http://www.policy.hu/themes06/resource/index.html.   
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Abundant natural resources can and should be a blessing - not a curse. We know what must be done. What 
is missing is the political will to make it so. 
Jozef Stiglitz, “The Resource Curse Revisited” 
 
Azerbaijan’s oil and gas resources belong to the people of Azerbaijan. The population has a right to know 
how much money Azerbaijan is earning, and to be reassured that revenues are being properly safeguarded. 
Laurie Bristow, UK Ambassador in Azerbaijan, in an interview with the Turan News Agency 
Introduction 
This policy study has been developed within the framework of the International 
Policy Fellowship program. It aims at suggesting policy options for direct public 
participation in the management of oil resources in Azerbaijan, thus contributing to 
policy dialogue around issues of transparency and accountability in the use of oil 
resources in the country. 
Azerbaijan’s economy is becoming increasingly dependent on oil, as illustrated by 
“resource dependence indicators”. Economic growth, although impressive within the 
last ten years, does not apply to the non-oil sector. A large number of people still live 
below the poverty line. Inequality, as illustrated by GINI coefficient, increased from 0.3 
in 1989-90 to 0.5 in 2000
1
, reflecting a widening inequality among geographic areas 
and various social strata. The country has the smallest per capita health expenditure 
and the highest child mortality rate among former Soviet Union countries
2
. In addition, 
the country has no strategic plan on how to use oil money to promote sustainable long-
term growth
3
. All these are “resource curse” symptoms
4
. 
A resource curse refers to an inverse relationship between high natural resource 
dependence and economic growth rates”
5
. Although, in the early 60’s, scholars pointed 
to a direct relationship between resource abundance and economic development, 
empirical evidence discards such a hypothesis: the per capita incomes of resource-
                                            
1 UNICEF Innocenti Research Center (2003), Social Monitor 2003. Florence: UNICEF, p.93 
2 http://www3.who.int/whosis/country/compare.cfm?country=AZE&indicator=PcTotEOHinIntD&language=english 
3 Joshua Kucera, “Irrational exuberance around Caspian energy”, Eurasianet, 25/09/06 
4 For more details on the harmful effects of the resource curse, see Michael Ross, “Extractive Sectors and the Poor” 
Oxfam America Report 2001, Michael Ross, “The Political Economy of the Resource Curse” World Politics 51 
(January 1999), 297-322, Michael Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy”, World Politics 53 (April 2001), 325–61, Terry 
Lynn Karl, “Understanding the Resource Curse” in Covering Oil: A Reporter’s Guide to Energy and Development, 
published by Revenue Watch, Open Society Institute and Initiative for Policy Dialogue, 2005 
5 Early theories on the relationship between extractive industries and economic growth are described in Extractive 
Sectors and the Poor, an Oxfam America Report by Michael Ross, 2001. 
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poor countries grew three times faster than those of resource-rich countries between 
1960 and 1990
6
; per capita GNP in OPEC members decreased by 1.3% per year, 
whereas non-oil developing countries experienced an average 2.2% annual growth for 
the period 1965 to 1998
7
. This and other data
8
 illustrates that resource abundance 
does not per se lead to economic growth. Indeed, natural resource dependence may 
actually impede economic growth; it can also result in increased inequalities, 
decreasing child welfare, and a greater vulnerability to economic and political setbacks 
and upheavals. 
Although limitations due to data availability do not allow any testing of the 
relationship between poverty and oil-dependence in Azerbaijan
9
, the above-mentioned 
symptoms, together with empirical evidence gained from other countries, are alarming. 
To explain the “resource curse” paradigm, economists refer to three main factors, 
namely (i) international price volatility, which has a negative effect on state budgetary 
planning and foreign investments; (ii) the “enclave” nature of natural resources, with 
there being very weak links between the hydrocarbon sector and the rest of the 
economy; and (iii) and a high risk of the “Dutch disease” occurring, i.e. where there is 
appreciation of the national currency’s real exchange rate, which damages other 
tradable sectors of economy. Political scientists point to the negative impact of 
resource richness on the governance system. Causal mechanisms of this effect are 
explained via a “rentier effect”, when governments use low taxation and patronage to 
relieve pressures on them to be accountable, the “repression effect”, which refers to a 
government’s increases in military spending, and a “modernisation effect”, which 
prevents oil-rich countries from making the social and cultural changes necessary so 
as to build democracy
10
.  
This policy study will argue that a “resource curse” is not inevitable if we take a look 
at the experiences of some resource-rich countries that have been relatively successful  
in avoiding such a curse through macroeconomic policies, economic diversification, the 
creation of natural resource funds, transparency and accountability, and also in the 
direct distribution of wealth. 
                                            
6 Andrew Rosser, “Why did Indonesia Overcome the Resource Curse?”, IDS working papers, March 2004, p. 1 
7 Terry Lynn Karl, “Understanding the Resource Curse” 
8 Michael Ross, “Extractive Sectors and the Poor”, Oxfam America 2001 
9 The HDI ranking is available for two years only; poverty assessments based on HBS were introduced only in 2001. 
In addition, the massive inflow of oil money into Azerbaijan’s economy began only in 2005 
11 Michael Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?”, World Politics, 53 (April 2001), 325-61 
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Before going into further detail, it will be acknowledged that attempts to fight the 
resource curse in several countries have given few positive results (e.g. in Indonesia, 
Chile and Botswana). The unconvincing outcomes of these attempts can be explained 
by the fact that all interventions to combat the resource curse presuppose a 
transparent and accountable government structure and a democratic political regime - 
which are not present in the majority of developing countries. Although robust political 
institutions are a necessary prerequisite for avoiding a resource curse, they cannot be 
built into resource-rich countries precisely due to the resource curse effect. A vicious 
circle - where “oil rents reinforce authoritarian regimes and thus prevent political 
changes” -has been seen by many scholars
11
. However, cases when resource curse 
was avoided (although perhaps exceptions) do offer an optimism when seeking ways 
to deal with the issue. 
It will also be mentioned that the pool of studies related to transparency and 
accountability in the managing of oil resources is small; there seems to be no empirical 
evidence showing that the transparent and accountable management of oil resources 
can help one avoid such a curse. Nevertheless, one needs to note that transparency 
and accountability, as indicators of civil liberties, do have a positive effect on the 
performance of a government’s investment projects
12
. 
As said, this study addresses only one of the variables that one might make use of 
in the struggle against a “resource curse” in Azerbaijan - improved transparency and 
accountability in oil wealth management.  The argument is that analytical methods 
related to direct public participation in the managing of oil resources could be one tool 
with which to ensure accountability.  
The purpose of this study is not to single out a policy option and develop 
recommendations for its implementation - instead, it aims at providing a framework for 
informed discussions via a thorough and comprehensive consultation process. 
The paper is organised into three main sections. Section I examines the risks 
associated with the “resource curse” in Azerbaijan - and outlines some of the 
challenges related to direct public participation in the management of the country’s oil 
resources. Section II identifies policy alternatives pointing to direct public participation 
                                            
11 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Michael Ross (2001), Terry Lynn Karl (1997)  
13
 Lant Pritchett, Daniel Kaufmann, “Civil Liberties, Democracy and the Performance of Government Projects”, 
Finance & Development, March 1998, p. 26 - 29 
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in the managing of oil resources; and Section III lays down criteria via which to evaluate 
these alternatives, projects outcomes for each alternative, and provides a comparative 
analysis of such outcomes against selected criteria. It concludes by giving brief 
recommendations concerning further research work that is needed in connection with 
the subject. 
1 Problem Description 
Azerbaijan may fall victim to the “resource curse” if a complex set of measures are 
not taken by both domestic actors and international players. The country can be 
identified by having heavy dependence on oil, high inequality and poverty rates, low 
human development indicators, a significant level of corruption and a very centralised 
decision-making system. As said, even though the limitations of data availability do not 
allow any testing of the actual relationship between poverty and oil-dependence in 
Azerbaijan13, we can merely note that the above-mentioned symptoms along with 
evidence from other countries are causes for alarm.  
In its attempt to tackle the issue, the government of Azerbaijan created the State Oil 
Fund and joined the Extract Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). However, neither 
of these attempts to increase transparency and accountability in oil resources’ 
management can be considered fully effective if there is no direct public participation in 
the system. 
Azerbaijan may face the danger of “resource curse” 
Azerbaijan’s economy is becoming increasingly dependent on oil (as illustrated in 
“resource dependence indicators”) – for about 74% of FDI (foreign direct investment) is 
concentrated in the oil and gas sector
14
. The hydrocarbon sector produces half of the 
tax revenue, with one third of budget revenue coming from the State Oil Company of 
Azerbaijan (SOCAR). The oil sector’s large share in trade is more than 85% of 
exports
15
. 
                                            
13 The HDI ranking is available for two years only; poverty assessments based on HBS were introduced only in 
2001; while the great inflow of oil money into Azerbaijan’s economy started only in 2005. 
14 EU/Azerbaijan Country Strategy Paper 
15 John Wakeman-Linn, Paul Mathieu and Bert van Selm, “Oil funds and revenue management in transition 
economies: the cases of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan” 
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Increases in inequality, a decline in growth and the deterioration of social welfare 
are seen as harmful effects of the resource curse – as mentioned above, inequality in 
Azerbaijan, as seen in the GINI coefficient, increased from 0.3 in 1989-90 to 0.5 in 
2000
16
, reflecting a growing inequality among geographic areas and different social 
strata. Economic growth is notable, yet this does not apply to the non-oil sector; the 
average rate of GDP growth for the period 1995–2005 was approximately 13%, with 
real GDP growth in 2005 reaching 26%
17
. Yet the increased GDP growth in the oil 
sector has been accompanied by a notable decline in the non-oil sector
18
. About 42% 
of GDP
19
 is concentrated in the hydrocarbon sector - which accounts for only 1% of 
employment!  Thus, one cannot expect the oil sector to help lower the high 
unemployment rate in Azerbaijan (11% in 2003)
20
 to any major degree. 
In spite of the considerable amount of GDP growth, poverty remains in Azerbaijan. 
WB data puts Azerbaijan among those countries that, within the last 20 years, have 
fallen back from being MIC (middle income) to LIC (low income) status (and Azerbaijan 
has not yet managed to return to MIC status)
21
. The poverty assessment report of 2002 
shows poverty levels that are as high as 47%
22
. The latest government report says that 
poverty has gone down to 27% in less than 2 years, however; though such a drastic 
change in poverty levels might be perceived as contentious - and, indeed, official 
statistics are being contested both inside the country and by the international 
community. 
In the Human Development Index Azerbaijan is in 101
st 
place; here, there is the 
smallest per capita health expenditure and the highest child mortality rate among 
former Soviet Union countries
23
. Child mortality and infant mortality rates for the period 
1991–2000 were estimated to be as high as 92/1,000 and 81/1,000
24
. The discrepancy 
between these figures and official statistics is significant,
25
 for certain drawbacks in 
                                            
16 UNICEF Innocenti Research Center (2003), Social Monitor 2003. Florence: UNICEF, p.93 
17 Country Profile 2006, Ministry of Economic Development. http://www.economy.gov.az/ 
18 Rupinder Singh – Juhani Laurila,” Azerbaijan: Recent Economic Developments and Policy Issues in the 
Sustainability of Growth”, 1999 http://www.bof.fi/bofit/eng/6dp/abs/pdf/dp0599.pdf  
19 Asian Development Outlook, http://www.adb.org/documents/books/ado/2006/aze.asp  
20 Unemployment data shows significant discrepancies. The State Employment Services has reported an 
unemployment rate of 1.2%. The SPPRED document refers to census data from 1999, and provides a non-
registered unemployment rate. 
21 Achieving the Millennium Development Goals: the Middle-Income Countries, a strategy for DFID: 2005-2008, p. 5 
22 Annual Repot (2003) on the State Program for Poverty Reduction and Economic Development, p.17. 
23http://www3.who.int/whosis/country/compare.cfm?country=AZE&indicator=PcTotEOHinIntD&language=english 
24 Reproductive Health Survey; according to the survey, infant and under-five mortality declined in the 1996-2001 
period, compared to in 1991-95 (infant mortality from 74.4 to 85.9; under-five mortality from 96.8 to 88.4) 
25 As indicated in the SPPRED Report, official statistics recorded infant mortality in Azerbaijan in 2002 as being 12.8 
per thousand live births - and the under-five mortality rate reached 23.1 per 1000 in 2002 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES / INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2006/07 
 9 
registering childbirth and maternal mortality
26
 do allow one to suggest that official 
statistics may well be underestimating the problem. 
Serious shortfalls in government accountability in Azerbaijan prevent poor people 
from capitalizing on the country’s natural and human resources to get themselves out 
of poverty. Azerbaijan is continually among the most corrupt countries in the world
27
. It 
has the highest average amount of bribe payments as a percentage of annual 
revenues among 22 transition countries
28
. As indicated in the Joint Staff Assessment 
Report, “the impact of budgetary spending is adversely affected by serious governance 
problems at all levels”
29
. (Even though this statement was made with regard to 
Azerbaijan’s health sector, it describes, no less accurately, the state of things in any 
other sector of the economic and social life of the country.) 
Transparency and accountability may help the country avoid the “resource 
curse” 
A resource curse is curable – and a number of scholars have explained the relative 
successes of some countries in overcoming a “resource curse”, which explanations can 
be divided into three groupings
30
. The first set of arguments refers to conservative 
macroeconomic and fiscal policies in relation to when a government accumulates 
foreign reserves, does not spend budget surpluses on deficit financing and tries to 
avoid external debt. The second set of explanations emphasises the role of privatising 
natural resources, for domestic businesses
31
 - as it is believed that private domestic 
ownership “would foster institutions that more effectively constrain state leaders, 
encourage them to invest in institution building, and enable them to respond more 
successfully to commodity booms and busts”
 32
. The third set of arguments focuses on 
the quality of institutions (the rule of law, bureaucratic excellence, a low level of 
                                            
26 Official statistics do not record death from pregnancy and postpartum complications at home as maternal mortality; and 
they do not register births of infants who die shortly after birth. In addition, early neo-natal deaths and early deaths of 
premature infants are registered as still-births. For more information see “Primary Health Care Assessment” as 
developed by USAID, and UNICEF’s Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 
27 Global Corruption Report, Transparency International 
28 http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/quinghua_presentation_hellman.pdf  
29 Joint Staff Assessment Report, p. 7 2004 
30 Andrew Rosser, “Why did Indonesia Overcome the Resource Curse?”, IDS Working papers, March 2004, p. 1 
31 Pauline Jones Luong, Erika Weinthal, “Prelude to the Resource Curse: Explaining Oil and Gas Development Strategies in Soviet 
Successor States and Beyond”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 34, No.4, May 2001, p. 367 - 399 
32 Erika Weinthal and Pauline Jones Luong, “Combating the Resource Curse”, Perspective on Politics, March 2006, Vol. 4, No. 1, 
p.36 
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government corruption) to explain how other countries have managed to avoid such a 
curse.  
This policy paper addresses only one variable within the “institutional quality” 
argument - transparency and accountability in the managing of oil resources; and the 
assumption is that transparent and the accountable management of oil resources is ‘a 
must’ if one wishes to convert resource abundance into economic and social 
development. 
Certain measures have already been undertaken to ensure the transparent, 
accountable management of oil resources in Azerbaijan. The State Oil Fund of 
Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) was created to have stabilisation and saving functions; it publishes 
a lot of information (including annual revenue reports) on its internet site33. Disclosure 
of information by SOFAZ, albeit commendable, benefits few people, however - for 
limited internet access, regular electricity shortages and much computer illiteracy 
among the general population raises questions about its effectiveness in terms of 
reaching a major part of the country’s population. In addition, SOFAZ’s highly technical 
financial reports are not accompanied by any explanations and/or analyses, thereby 
adding to the overall complexity of things. Such concerns thus create major challenges 
for SOFAZ with regard to its ensuring “transparency in its activities, which are (claimed 
to be) open to both official and public scrutiny”34. 
Information disclosed by SOFAZ is restricted to the revenue side only. It is 
interesting to note that many persons in Azerbaijan believe that oil belongs to the 
country’s president because they do not know where the oil money is spent35 - for 
SOFAZ expenditure is, indeed, entirely at the discretion of the president. Azerbaijan’s 
State Oil Fund had over US$288 million in expenditures during the first six months of 
2006, of which US$29.8 million - or just over 10% of the overall funds - was earmarked 
for infrastructure projects36. The country has no strategic plan on how to use oil money 
to promote sustainable long-term growth; thus, SOFAZ serves as a secondary budget, 
i.e. “a pot of money to be dipped into when other means cannot be found”37. 
                                            
33 http://www.oilfund.az  
34 SOFAZ, Annual Report 2001, p.45 
35 A local NGO, called Himayadar, conducted a survey among the population in Ali-Bayramli, asking people what they know about 
oil and the government’s role in the management of oil resources. People were largely concerned about corruption in relation to the 
distribution in oil revenues, as they did not know where oil revenues actually go. Forty percent of survey respondents said that oil 
belongs to the president - while fewer than 15 percent of persons said that oil belongs the people (Evaluation Report Part I, by 
Kate Watters, p.11). We do not have data to verify that such an attitude may be true for the country as a whole, though. 
36 Joshua Kucera, “Irrational exuberance’s around Caspian energy”, Eurasianet, 25/09/06 
37 Svetlana Tsalik, Sabir Bagirov, Ingilab Akhmedov, “The State Oil Fund of the Azerbaijan Republic”, Caspian Oil 
Windfalls, p.112 
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Azerbaijan has joined the EITI (Extract Industries Transparency Initiative)
38
 and the 
EITI National Commission, which has 5 ministries
39
; SOFAZ, the NGO coalition - 
consisting of 18 local NGOs, the EITI group and an independent auditing company 
were additionally established to ensure the transparent and accountable management 
of oil revenues [N.B. the purpose of the EITI is to increase transparency and 
accountability in the managing of oil and gas revenues - though it does not take on 
board the expenditure side]. A recent survey
40
 looking at government agency attitudes 
to the EITI shows that 3 government agencies (officially members of EITI National 
Commission) were unaware of such an initiative, however. Out of 11 government 
agencies covered by the survey, only 3 had adopted the practice of browsing the EITI 
National Coalition’s internet site. Interestingly enough, both government and NGO 
Coalition representatives assessed existing public oversight mechanisms as being 
ineffective - though each side saw this as the responsibility of the other – i.e. the 
government blamed the NGO Coalition for its “inability to offer effective public oversight 
mechanisms”, whereas NGO Coalition members said that public oversight will be 
improved if, among other measures, government brings NGO representatives onto the 
SOFAZ Supervisory Board and finances projects overseen by NGO Coalition 
members. Unfortunately, the survey does not address questions related to the 
transparency and accountability of NGO Coalition members as regards their 
constituencies/constituents. 
 
Direct citizen participation vs. participation through representatives 
Attempts towards increased transparency and accountability in the managing of oil 
resources in Azerbaijan have predominantly focused on having information about oil 
revenue management disclosed (although information related to expenditure remains 
difficult to track). However, as suggested by Richard G. Steiner, the concept of 
transparency needs to be distinguished from informed public participation
41
: 
“…transparency is a necessary, but not sufficient component of informed public 
                                            
38 http://www.eiti-az.org  
39 The Ministry of Industry and Energy, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources, Ministry of 
Economic Development, and the State Statistics Committee  
40 “Three Views of EITI Implementation”, Economic Research Centre, 2006. 
41 Richard G. Steiner, “Models of Public Oversight of Government and Industry” in Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who Will 
Benefit? p. 71 
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participation in a democracy. To have an active voice, the public, or at least a 
representative body of the public, needs to have a legitimate and formalised role 
overseeing and interacting with industry and government.” 
This distinction is particularly important in countries like Azerbaijan, where systemic 
problems related to representation, legitimacy and the accountability of structures and 
institutions - including those within “civil society” - bring up issues relating to direct 
public participation rather than participation via representation in different governmental 
and non-governmental institutions/structures. 
Representation and participation via governmental institutions and structures have 
been challenged by electoral setbacks. All elections, including the presidential elections 
of 2003, municipality elections in 2004 and the most recent parliamentary elections 
from 2005 were plagued by gross manipulations, significant irregularities and 
fraudulent behaviour – all in favour of the ruling party
42
. 
There is endemic corruption in all spheres of life in Azerbaijan. Therefore, it would 
be naïve to assume that any part of the system, be it government or non-governmental 
institutions, is completely unbound by characteristics existing in the system as a whole. 
In this context, civil society in Azerbaijan (the mass media and NGOs) needs to go a 
long way before becoming truly independent and free. 
Most local NGOs in Azerbaijan are far from being fully transparent and really 
representative. Among other difficulties, civil society in Azerbaijan faces a major 
challenge with regard to legitimacy [whether NGOs truly represent the interests of poor 
women and men?] and capacity [whether recommendations developed by the NGO 
can be supported by evidence – or are they, rather, merely based on specific political 
preferences?]. 
Criticism of citizen’s direct involvement in policy analysis has the following three 
main concerns: (i) rational decision-making requires technical expertise – which is not 
available to the general public (i.e. problems are too complex for the average person to 
understand); (ii) citizens are either uninterested in issues, or pursue their own self-
interest, rather than observe the general public good; and (iii) direct citizen’s 
participation is “time consuming, expensive, complicated, and emotionally draining”
43
. 
                                            
42 For detailed information on election irregularities in Azerbaijan, see reports by the OSCE, the Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, and Human 
Rights Watch 
43 J. Aydelotte, and J. Miller, “Putting More ‘Public’ into Policy Analysis”, Public Administration Review, July/August 
2000, Vol. 60, No. 4, p. 350 
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This paper does not aim to recommend the most effective and efficient ways of 
spending oil money in Azerbaijan; nor does it argue that involving more citizens in 
debates will automatically improve government spending decisions regarding oil 
resources. It does, however, rely on two main assumptions - first, transparent and 
accountable management of oil resources is a significant component in any struggle 
against the “resource curse”; and, second, in a countries marked with endemic 
structural problems regarding representation and legitimacy, direct citizen participation 
might be more effective than participation via NGOs and other representative 
structures
44
. 
2 Policy Alternatives   
This section examines three policy alternatives that might involve citizens directly in 
the managing of oil resources. The three alternatives - deriving from literature reviews 
as well as discussions with researchers and experts in Azerbaijan - are (1) dispensing 
oil revenues directly to citizens in forms of cash payment; (2) a fiscal decentralisation of 
oil resources as regards administration; and (3) public hearings in relation to oil 
revenues and expenditure. 
 
 
Alternative I: Directly dispensing oil revenues in forms of cash payment 
Direct public ‘participation’ will occur via dispensing oil revenues directly to citizens 
in the form of cash payments. This option, as adopted in Alaska (USA), presupposes 
that a certain percentage of oil income (which amount is determined either via a 
referendum or through routine legislative regulations) will be placed in a fund (e.g. the 
Permanent Fund in Alaska); such a fund will, beyond this, distribute a share of accrued 
interest to each citizen as a dividend, too. 
The fund’s revenues may or may not depend on the price of oil or on the state 
budget (SOFAZ in this regard resembles the Alaska Permanent Fund - for its revenues 
do not depend on the price of oil or on the state budget). Direct payments to citizens 
                                            
44 Unless there is a strong link between these institutions and their constituency members - which is not usually the 
case in such countries 
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will vary in size depending on the fund’s performance at any given time. In Alaska, 
these dividends are calculated by “averaging the Fund’s net income over the last five 
years, dividing by two, and then dividing among the eligible recipients. What remains 
after dividends and inflation-proofing becomes the Earnings Reserve Account, which 
legislatures may then disperse…”45.  
The fund is managed by a separate corporation that has an independent board of 
trustees; and it is overseen by the legislature. The corporation’s mandate is to 
maximize earnings by investing the principal; while the final say over proposed 
investments stays with the legislature. 
Alternative II: Fiscal decentralization of oil resources 
Direct public participation in the management of oil resources could be promoted  
via the fiscal decentralization of oil revenues, which might be done in three ways
46
: (i) 
sub-national government taxes the oil industry directly; (ii) sub-national government 
receives direct transfers of a share of central government’s mineral revenues; and (iii) 
sub-national government receives indirect transfers from central government (revenues 
allocated according to the national budgeting process).  
Within this policy study, the fiscal decentralisation option for the country will be 
looked at through the municipality structure - though discussion of this issue is made 
difficult due to confusions existing about what institution might be considered a unit of 
decentralization: Executive Committees (presidential appointees ruling local units of the 
executive branch) or municipalities (elected institutions of local self-governance - not 
subordinated (supposedly) to either the executive or the legislature)? 
According to Article 142 of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic, local self-
governance is carried out by municipalities via elections. However, local self-
governance is exercised, in practice, via Executive Committees, that is, Presidential 
appointees operating at a local level. Executive Committees manage all financial 
resources and allocations from the state budget (related to education, health, social 
assistance, etc.). Indeed, up until 2005, the law defined municipalities as “non-
governmental institutions”, although following a recent amendment municipalities are 
now no longer considered non-government institutions - yet they have not received 
                                            
45 Natural Resource Funds, Caspian Oil Windfalls, p. 23 
46 Michael Ross, the “How Can a Mineral Rich States Reduce Inequality?” chapter (p. 15) 
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“governmental body” status either. Hence, we are dealing with an institution of local 
self-governance that is not a part of public administration and which performs duties 
that are ‘supplementary’ to those undertaken by the Executive Committee. 
In Azerbaijan, according to national legislation, municipalities are entitled to levy 
four types of tax: (i) land use tax levied from physical persons; (2) property tax levied 
from physical persons; (3) a mineral royalty tax on construction materials having local 
importance (which might include brick-tile clays, mortar sand, raw materials made from 
crushed stone); and (4) profit taxes coming from enterprises and organisations owned 
by municipalities (22%).
47
 Thus, given that their roles and responsibilities have been 
stipulated in law in this regard, municipalities cannot directly tax the oil industry – so 
this option is neither available nor, at the present moment, feasible. 
The option of municipalities in Azerbaijan receiving direct transfers of a share of 
central government’s mineral revenues is highly questionable due to reasons given by 
M. Ross48: direct transfers from oil income will make municipal budgets fully dependent 
on oil prices – thus, any price fluctuations on international oil markets will have a very 
drastic effect on municipalities; and this will have a dramatic outcome given 
municipalities’ marginal capacities to manage their own funds. In addition, 
municipalities functioning as village councils in Azerbaijan will not have any capacity to 
absorb such investments. Indeed, the majority of municipalities in Azerbaijan do not 
even have basic budget documents, let alone the ability to manipulate oil revenue-
money. During the preliminary in-country discussions with researchers and experts this 
option was deemed to be irrelevant and non-feasible for Azerbaijan. 
The option of municipalities receiving indirect transfers from the state budget is 
more feasible – perhaps necessary - given the limited financial resources that are 
available to municipalities. Currently, the tax-raising capacity of municipalities has its 
limits – and taxes on the most lucrative assets and activities remain under control of 
Executive Committees. In many cases, subsidies from the state budget remain the only 
revenue sources had by municipalities. These subsidies and other forms of allocation 
from the central state budget are not regulated by any specific mechanisms or 
procedure. The average municipal budget per capita was as low as US$ 0.50 in 200449; 
                                            
47 Ministry of Finance, http://www.maliyye.gov.az/  
48 Michael Ross, the “How can Mineral Rich States Reduce Inequality?” chapter in the book. 
49 “A Needs Assessment of Municipal Services Development”, Weitz Center for Development Studies, 2005, p. 6; 
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though there was a slight increase to US$ 2.4 in 200550. Meanwhile, state transfers to 
municipal budgets went down from 37.4% (of municipal budget revenues) in 2002 to 
10.7% in 2004. Municipalities increasingly complain about the lack of resources making 
it difficult for them to play their roles and take on board their responsibilities51. 
However, this option will need to be further ‘refined’ so as to make more clear 
specific conditions and formulae via which transfer amounts can be calculated. Current 
legislation defines neither principles nor criteria for any distribution of subsidies and 
subventions to local municipalities. Changes thus need to be made in the current 
status quo, i.e. where transfers to municipal budgets are made through Executive 
Committees’ accounts. Discussions held with the National Advocacy Group
52
 - which is 
engaged in drafting the concept of fiscal and administrative decentralisation in 
Azerbaijan - can contribute to policy debate pertaining to this alternative. 
Alternative III: Public hearings 
The Caspian Revenue Watch has developed recommendations on improving 
transparent and accountable management of oil resources in Azerbaijan
53
 and, among 
other suggestions, it highlighted the importance of holding public hearings to “gauge 
public opinion on spending priorities”
54
. The main questions here are: “Who will 
organize a public hearing - and how? And how will its costs be covered?  
A public hearing - where citizens participate in a deliberative process 
facilitated/administered by a representative of public administration system - is a tool 
via which to communicate citizens’ direct (albeit ‘non-binding’) feelings as regards 
policy making
55
. Public hearings are broadly seen not only as a tool for improving 
transparency and accountability in the management of natural resources but, also, as a 
useful technique giving community empowerment. This method has been successfully 
used in number of countries
56
, and has its benefits, i.e. citizens can communicate their 
preferences more specifically (e.g. compared to in a referendum); there is a forum for 
                                            
50 Calculations by Rovshan Agayev in the Economic Research Centre 
51 Information collected via meetings with 40 municipalities in Central Azerbaijan as well conferences having the 
participation of municipality representatives. 
52 An activity within the municipality development program supported by Oxfam GB in Azerbaijan and ICCO 
53 http://www.revenuewatch.org/azerbaijan/reports/ 
54 Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who will Benefit? Caspian Revenue Watch, OSI/Central Eurasia Project, p. 28 
55 Term borrowed from T.A. Steelman, W. Asher, “Public Involvement Methods in Natural Resource Policy-Making: 
Advantages, Disadvantages and Trade-offs”, Policy Sciences 30, 71 – 90, 1997 
56 Goetz, R. J., “Accounts and Accountability: Theoretical Implications of the Right-to-Information Movement in 
India”, Strengthening Participation in Local Governance, IDS, 1999  
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information exchange between the general public and experts (although it often flows in 
a one-way direction); and thorough deliberative processes give a potential for 
compromise. Public hearings, however, can be laborious and time-consuming, and if 
not properly managed may lead to conflicts owing to very contrasting interests being 
held by participants. There is also a risk of having emotionally heated debates, where 
the government may then surrender to populist decisions rather than considering long-
term strategic objectives. So any agency organizing public hearings will need to be 
clear about the specific procedures by which one uses the input gained from the public 
in the decision-making process. 
Citizen’s involvement in decision-making and input from the general public might 
serve different purposes: (i) identifying alternatives with regard to a policy issue; (ii) 
actually assessing public opinion concerning an issue (or set of issues); and (iii) noting 
the form in which public opinion makes itself heard (“persuading the public to come 
down on the side of a recommended alternative”)
57
. Public hearings can also be utilized 
to educate the general public about certain issues. In this case, however, a clear 
distinction must be made between informing the public of government decisions and 
involving the public in government decision-making
58
. 
Attempts at holding national-level public hearings were made by the SPPRED 
(State Program on Poverty Reduction and Economic Development) Secretariat in 
2004. The town-hall meetings held within the “participatory SPPRED process” achieved 
very little in terms of identifying country development priorities - for it was difficult to see 
the links between concerns raised by people during town-hall meetings and activities 
identified in the SPPRED document. Yet the most recent report published within the 
State Program on Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development shows that some 
progress has been made in this area
59
. 
The brief experiences had in relation to public hearings held by the NGO do not 
allow one to arrive at clear conclusions. There is some evidence
60
 that public hearings 
might cost only a little when held at the municipality level - whereas adopting this tool at 
                                            
57 J. Aydelotte, and J. Miller, “Putting More ‘Public’ in Policy Analysis”, Public Administration Review, July/August 
2000, Vol. 60, No. 4, p. 352 
58 Taken from M. Berner, “Citizen Participation in Local Government Budgeting”, Popular Government, Spring 2001, 
p. 23 - 30 
59 State Program on Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development (SPPRSD), Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), Regional Workshops 
60 Public hearings on municipality budgets were held in 28 municipalities of Central Azerbaijan, covering the Barda, 
Goranboy, Yevlakh, Agdash and Terter regions. The project was implemented by the Economic Research Centre, 
with support from Oxfam GB in Azerbaijan. 
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a national level might imply greater costs and require an elaborate mechanism for 
processing data and channeling people’s ‘requests’. 
Experience with public hearings at a municipality level shows that there is a very 
limited amount of participation (3-5% of the total population)
61
. Thus, additional efforts 
at building social trust, empowering people and strengthening participation are needed 
to make this policy alternative viable in Azerbaijan. 
3 Analysis and Recommendations  
Projected outcomes 
As mentioned in Section I, direct citizen participation in the management of oil 
resources is suggested as a possible alternative to the current situation – in which we 
see corruption, mismanagement, ill representation and a weak civil society. This has 
informed the choice of projected outcomes and evaluation criteria; and proposed 
moves will be examined in terms of improved transparency and accountability in 
decision-making regarding the managing of oil resources. 
Transparency is to be judged by (i) a citizen’s ability to request and obtain 
information; and (ii) whether decision-making agencies report to citizens. Accountability 
will be operationalized through (i) a citizen’s power to influence decision-making; and 
(ii) whether there is a system for taking on board people’s complaints. 
Seen below are outcomes projected for each of the alternatives listed in Section II; 
they are outlined in the table and are further elaborated in the text below it. It should be 
noted, too, that the current situation (i.e. information disclosure by the State Oil Fund 
and participation via the NGO) is also included in the list of policy alternatives, so that 
one is able to make a valid comparison.  
 
                                            
61 Municipality Development project implemented by the Economic Research Centre, with support from Oxfam GB in 
Azerbaijan 
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ALTERNATIVES 
 
PROJECTED 
OUTCOMES Status 
quo/Present 
situation 
Alternative I 
(direct 
distribution) 
Alternative II 
(decentralization) 
Alternative 
III 
(public 
hearing) 
Transparency Less Less Depends Greater 
 Potential for citizens 
to request information 
Less Less Greater Greater 
 Reporting to citizens Not regular, 
indirect 
Regular, 
indirect 
Regular, direct Not 
required 
Accountability Less Less Higher Higher 
 Potential for citizens 
to influence decisions 
Less Less Higher Higher 
 System via which to 
channel citizens’ 
complaints 
Does not 
exist 
Does not 
exist 
Exists Exists 
 
ALTERNATIVE I. 
Direct disbursement of dividends to every citizen – that is, when all persons will 
receive an equal and pre-determined share of oil income – will foster further equality in 
society. A uniform transfer to all citizens will act like a progressive form of tax (or, more 
accurately, a negative regressive tax) and will produce a lessening in the rich-to-poor 
income ratio and thereby reduce the level of vertical inequality62. 
Citizens do not own have strong leverage (e.g. via elections, a referendum) to 
oblige the body managing the oil fund to disclose information publicly. However, 
legislators could enforce the disclosure of information by making this a legal 
requirement. The oil fund managing body submits regular reports to the legislative body 
of government. Certain issues raised in the reports might also be taken to the public, 
for discussion. There is, however, no direct reporting to citizens at the present time. 
Giving each citizen a portion of the state’s oil wealth may lessen demands for 
increased state spending - which argument is based on the libertarian tenet that an 
economy will develop more when people are given the freedom to spend their own 
money rather than having the state spend money on their behalf. Actually, the 
government, particularly in the context of a developing country, will most probably lack 
the capacity to efficiently absorb oil revenues. Thus, a decentralized form of 
                                            
62 Michael Ross, the “How Can Mineral Rich States Reduce Inequality?” chapter 
LEYLA KARIMLI: INFORMED CITIZENRY, ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT AND THE EFFECTIVE 
MANAGEMENT OF OIL RESOURCES 
 20 
‘absorption’, including a direct disbursement of dividends, is something that is 
necessary. In addition, it is believed that distributing dividends directly to citizens will 
increase economic demand and thus contribute to developing the domestic, demand-
led market economy63.  
If people receive oil income dividends, they may have more incentive to hold 
government accountable, and this will promote participation and foster democracy. In 
addition, keeping oil revenues out of the hands of politicians may reduce corruption, 
rent-seeking and government inefficiency. Citizens’ potential to influence decisions will 
be exercised principally through the government’s legislature, although certain issues 
might be taken to referendum. At the moment, there is no formalized system (apart 
from resorting to legislators) allowing for a direct communication of citizens’ complaints.  
Bearing in mind the high level of corruption and poor governance in Azerbaijan, 
implementation of a direct disbursement of oil income to each citizen may have 
significant costs - and be risky, too. It might, for a start, be difficult to ensure the real 
independence of the oil-fund managing body due to the major risk of “crony 
appointments” of trustees and the creation of a government-linked oligarchy (similar to 
that which emerged via the country’s privatization process). 
Although direct disbursement of oil revenues will create more incentives for 
people’s participation in the management of oil resources, it still requires great political 
reform on the side of government in terms of increasing the overseeing role of 
parliament and narrowing the gap between politicians and their constituencies. In 
Alaska, the Alaska Permanent Fund was established after extensive direct 
consultations with citizens – and, due to constitutional restrictions, it could not be 
created until the majority of citizens had voted for it. In Azerbaijan, SOFAZ was created 
via presidential decree, and the country’s president has full discretionary power over 
SOFAZ; so there is no room for checks and balances in such a situation. In Alaska, the 
legislature has final say over investment suggestions coming from the APFC; and they 
actually decide what to do with the Fund’s annual ‘earnings’. In Azerbaijan, the Milli 
Mejlis (Parliament) plays close to no role here. Thus, expanding the role of parliament 
is necessary to improve the quality of governance and increase accountability in the 
management of oil resources. Yet this should be merely one component of many 
                                            
63 Thomas I. Palley, “Combating the Natural Resource Curse with Citizen Revenue Distribution Funds: Oil and the 
Case of Iraq”, Foreign Policy In Focus, December 2003. 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES / INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2006/07 
 21 
changes occurring within the system overall, including reforms made to the election 
system.  
A question also arises as to how persons will actually be involved in the managing 
of oil resources. Will it be via referenda and extensive public consultations (as in 
Alaska) or through political representation (as in other countries)? Also, even if 
people’s opinions are sought through a referendum, notorious electoral irregularities in 
Azerbaijan raise questions about the efficiency of this instrument. From another point 
of view, government may use direct disbursement of oil income as a means of “fiscal 
pacification” of the population; for Azerbaijani society has very little immunity to rent-
seeking tendencies - citizens may fall victim to a free-rider attitude, thereby pushing 
government to spend more on dividends and so impede the “saving” function of the oil 
fund. 
Direct disbursement of dividends could be based on certain conditions (immunizing 
children, enrolling them in school, etc.), which will make it a means via which to achieve 
social goals64. There will be a certain cost involved in setting up a system that is able to 
check whether every family is respecting the conditions laid down for the distribution of 
dividends. The provision of social assistance in Azerbaijan has already faced notable 
mismanagement problems linked to the poor state of available statistics (e.g. paying 
pensions to people who exist only on paper65); there is also a risk of paying dividends 
to “non-existing people” or making multiple payments to the same person. 
ALTERNATIVE II. 
The benefits of fiscal decentralization in relation to oil incomes fall within the 
general belief that decentralization promotes democracy and good governance as 
people can more easily obtain access to government and thus become ‘empowered’. 
One might then say that “local policy decisions reflecting this empowerment will provide 
a more suitable infrastructure, better living conditions and enhanced economic 
growth”66. People organize themselves best around problems they consider most 
important. Local control over the amount, quality and benefits of development activities 
                                            
64 Michael Ross, the “How Can Mineral-Rich States Reduce Inequality?” chapter. Another type of conditionality is 
described by Thomas I. Palley 
65 Reports developed by the Aran Humanitarian Regional Development Organization, and the Economic Research 
Centre 
66 Harry Blair, Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic Local Governance in Six Countries, 
World Development, Vol.28, No.1, pp. 21-39, 2000, p. 23. 
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can enable the process to be self-sustaining. Such arguments might apply to 
Azerbaijan, where most municipalities cover small villages with 500-1,000 families - so 
they could thus be seen as types of local council that have very close links with village 
residents. 
Decentralization may well have a positive effect on citizen participation and 
bureaucratic efficiency67. Citizens elect their local government - so they will have 
stronger leverage when it comes to seeking the public disclosure of information; and 
they may also be able to enjoy greater influence over decision-making via participatory 
planning and a regular monitoring of concerns. Empirical evidence points to the 
existence of a negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption - i.e. 
the higher the level of fiscal decentralization, the lower the level of corruption68. 
Receiving direct transfers from the state budget will significantly expand financial 
resources available to municipalities, thus enabling them to perform their roles and take 
on their responsibilities as stipulated in law (“dealing with local social and economic 
problems”)
69
. Deprived of the financial resources necessary for implementing 
development projects, municipalities lack credibility in the eyes of local citizens. This 
partly accounts for the low turnouts in municipality elections as well as for problems in 
collecting municipal/local taxes. Taken as far as it could go, such a policy alternative 
might contribute to improving the service-providing capacities of municipalities and 
increase for women, men and children at the local level. 
In spite of these assumptions, however, the risks inherent in implementing this 
alternative in Azerbaijan are high. There is little evidence that the development of local 
governance can be directly linked with poverty reduction because when governance is 
decentralized local elites get most of the power and can thereby steer benefits towards 
themselves... Also, there is no evidence to say whether local elites might be more likely 
(when compared to national elites) to magnanimously aim government resources at the 
poor70. 
                                            
67 Huther, J., Anwar Shah, Applying a Simple Measure of Good Governance to the Debate on Fiscal 
Decentralization, World Bank Policy Research Working Papers, 1998, no. 1894 
68 Fishman, R., Gatti, R., Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence Across Countries?, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Papers, 2000, no. 2290 
69 Law on the Status of Municipalities, Republic of Azerbaijan 
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Municipality elections (as is the case with presidential and parliamentary ones) have 
witnessed serious irregularities and fraud. Electoral turnout at the municipality elections 
of December 2004 was about 46% - compared to 71% in the presidential elections71. 
Owing to irregularities in voting statistics, one cannot, however, entirely rely on voting 
data to come to the conclusion that there is less citizen participation at a municipal 
level compared to at a national one. And, indeed, most central government structures 
seem to be trusted more than municipality ones – i.e. slightly over 30% of the 
population surveyed by Transparency International said they trust municipal 
authorities72; about 70% of respondents had paid a bribe when purchasing or legalising 
a land plot (a service provided by the municipality) - and more than 74% of 
respondents did not believe that it is possible to “purchase or legalise land plots” 
without paying a bribe. 
The majority of current municipality leaders used to be in governing positions 
beforehand - either as Soviet-era “kolkhoz” managers or as post-Soviet senior civil 
servants; and little has changed in their attitudes to power (which they see as a means 
of income generation - thus entailing the mismanagement and misappropriation of 
public goods). Election irregularities and corruption at a municipal level pose questions 
about real representation: (i) Are citizens truly represented by municipalities? (ii) Are 
there safeguards for preventing resource misappropriation at a municipal level? (iii) Are 
municipalities willing (and able) to give the public direct access to the ways and means 
of the management of available resources? 
Municipalities that have gone through capacity-building programs provided by 
international organisations have developed certain, though not very elaborate, 
reporting mechanism with which to inform constituents about municipal revenues and 
expenditure73. However, municipalities benefiting from this type of capacity-building 
                                            
71 Central Election Commission of the Republic of Azerbaijan www.cec.az  
72 Transparency International Azerbaijan, “Country Corruption Assessment: Public Opinion Survey in Azerbaijan”, 
2004, p. p. 22; 27. Here, we use an aggregate figure combining “fully trust”, “trust” and “somewhat trust”. 
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 In municipalities benefiting from projects supported by Oxfam GB and ICCO, about 46% of respondents (N=30) 
had participated in municipality budget formulations, about 73% of respondents (N=162) said municipalities are 
there to serve the people, while 22% see municipalities as serving clan interests only and they are fully subordinate 
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LEYLA KARIMLI: INFORMED CITIZENRY, ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT AND THE EFFECTIVE 
MANAGEMENT OF OIL RESOURCES 
 24 
constitute no more than 1% of the total number74. In all, mechanisms of popular control 
to be seen at non-election times are thus marginal - if they in fact exist! 
ALTERNATIVE III. 
Public hearings, if implemented carefully, could serve as a tool for channeling 
citizen’s voices; and if regarded as a deliberative democracy instrument, it might be 
argued that public hearings not only improve the decision-making process (here related 
to the management of resources) by making it more fair – they additionally positively 
contribute to the quality of any outcome: “public deliberations are concerned with 
finding the best way of regulating matters of public concern, whereby the ‘best way’ is 
judged according to standards of rationality that have a certain objectivity”75. 
Public hearings may be more successful if held by municipalities rather than via the 
NGO. The link between citizens and the NGO is not conditioned by elections or by 
reporting requirements, as it is the case with municipalities. In its country corruption 
assessment, Transparency International held a public opinion survey to examine 
“public confidence” in various government and non-governmental 
structures/institutions76. And it is interesting to note that local and the international NGO 
seem to cause the biggest confusion compared to all other government and non-
governmental structures and institutions – for around 26% of research respondents, 
the highest percentage in this category, found it difficult to say whether they trusted or 
distrusted local/international NGOs. When asked if it is possible to receive assistance 
or services without paying a bribe, 32% of respondents (again, the largest percentage 
in this category) found this question difficult to answer (i.e. they were not sure whether 
they could get humanitarian aid from a local or international NGO without paying a 
bribe). Further research would have helped us to understand the causes of this opacity: 
is it due to a general lack of awareness regarding NGO activities? Does it allow one to 
draw conclusions about the gap between NGOs and their beneficiaries? 
If conducted by the NGO, the costs of public hearing will be covered by the 
international NGO (i.e. Azerbaijan’s government does not give direct grants to NGOs). 
A local NGO will be accountable to its donor only (which is mostly the case now); and a 
public hearing will deal with the subject initiated by the donor program. In contrast, if 
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conducted by a municipality, a public hearing might be covered by the municipal 
budget. A municipality is accountable to its constituencies at least via the electoral 
process; and the hearing will be held using a municipality budget performance which 
has major relevance for citizens. Costs of holding a public hearing will be higher if they 
are held at a national level and covered by an international agency (because it will 
include administration costs not occurring at a municipal level). 
The general political situation in Azerbaijan may make public hearings non-feasible 
unless directly authorised by a government institution. Currently, Azerbaijan is seen as 
semi-consolidated, authoritarian regime
77
. Government agencies responsible for 
budgeting are reluctant to open up to civil society participation despite AzGov’s 
commitment to international agreements with the IMF, WB, Council of Europe, etc. As 
indicated in the WB’s Country Assistance Strategy for the Azerbaijan Republic, one of 
the major areas to be improved is “further refinement of costing and a prioritization of 
actions consistent with annual budget envelopes, within the Medium-Term Expenditure 
Framework and Public Investment Program”. It is difficult to keep track of national 
expenditure because there is a vague (if any) link between expenditure choices and 
reform plans (or declared policy objectives). The lack of linkage between reforms and 
expenditure implications related to such reforms is also due to the poor cost evaluation 
of policies/reforms as stipulated in a number of state programs aiming to reduce 
poverty, develop rural areas, promote entrepreneurship, etc. 
Thus, an NGO will need to have a “special liaison” with local government authorities 
to conduct public hearings that are specifically in connection with the handling of oil 
resources and other budget issues. In contrast, the municipality, as an institution of 
local self-governance, is entitled by national legislation to hold hearings and have 
meetings with its constituents. The main question here, as outlined in the previous 
policy option, is how closely municipalities are linked to their constituencies and what 
might be the incentive for holding a public hearing. 
The country’s political regime gives little room for political contests. However, under 
the umbrella of this regime, various structures (e.g. NGOs, municipalities) may 
generate different levels of social trust, and thus allow for different degrees and types 
of participation. Unfortunately, very limited data is available on ‘social trust’ in 
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Azerbaijan - for example as related to NGO and municipality structures (and data 
produced by Transparency International shows that people have very little trust such 
bodies). Yet there is a methodological question one might ask: what type of trust would 
generate more participation? For, as said earlier, there is at the present time a 
generally low social and political participation rate in Azerbaijan – which might be even 
lower if persons are discussing complex issues, such as the management of oil 
resources. 
Local government, when it is elected, can be seen to be accountable to the public
78
. 
Thus, elected local government institutions may be in a better position to channel 
people’s voices and to monitor decisions related to the managing of oil revenue and 
expenditure, or at least the portion of such revenues that are allocated as development 
funds. One can see that elected local government institutions are best placed to 
implement at least three out of six activities when monitoring oil revenues and 
expenditures, namely: (1) simplifying and disseminating information; (2) identifying and 
setting priorities; and (3) tracking revenues and expenditures
79
. In addition, 
municipalities are the bodies best placed to hold public hearings to “gauge public 
opinion on spending priorities” (as suggested by Caspian Revenue Watch)
80
. 
Evaluating the outcomes of policy alternatives 
Evaluation criteria – when recognizing the problem, and deriving from a literature 
review and discussions with experts - include the following: (i) direct citizen 
participation; (ii) decision-makers’ accountability to citizens; (iii) political feasibility; and 
(iv) technical capacity required for the implementation of any policy. 
It needs to be acknowledged that a number of noteworthy limitations - a lack of 
quantitative data, theoretical speculations rather than empirical evidence, etc. - have 
restricted any attempt to project and evaluate outcomes for each of the policy 
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alternatives described above; so more questions need to be answered and more data 
is required if we wish to develop specific policy recommendations on the subject. 
 
 
. 
 
POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
INDICATORS 
Status-quo Alternative I Alternative II Alternative III 
Does it allow for 
direct citizen 
participation? 
Disclosing 
information 
about 
management 
of oil 
revenues 
does not 
require the 
direct 
participation 
of citizens 
Allows for direct 
participation if 
decisions are 
made via 
referenda 
Given the 
electoral 
problems and 
institutional 
challenges, 
direct 
participation of 
citizens will vary 
among 
municipalities 
Allows for direct 
participation, yet 
incentives for participation 
still need to be examined 
Does it promote 
greater 
accountability of 
decision-makers 
regarding the 
citizen? 
There is little 
(if any) room 
for citizens to 
influence 
decisions. A 
system by 
which to 
channel 
citizens’ 
complaints is 
non-existent. 
Even though 
citizens might 
have more 
incentives to 
exercise their 
rights, greater 
accountability 
will need 
reforms 
increasing 
parliamentary 
oversight. 
Citizens elect 
local 
government. 
Hence they 
have the power 
to hold it 
accountable. 
This, however, 
is subject to 
further reforms, 
ones 
strengthening 
institutional 
mechanisms 
(reporting to 
citizens, 
channeling 
citizen’s 
complaints, 
etc.) 
Provides citizens with a 
formalized forum via 
which to express their 
preferences and 
communicate complaints. 
Yet final decision-making 
does not lie with the 
people. Neither do they 
have any electoral 
leverage. 
Is it politically 
feasible? 
Yes Major risks of 
“crony 
appointments” 
and mis-
management in 
the absence of a 
strong 
Parliament 
Yes. 
Decentralization 
and the 
development of 
local self-
governance is 
one of the 
priorities had by 
the current 
administration 
Is feasible if authorization 
from central authorities is 
obtained 
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How easy is it to 
build up 
technical 
capacity? 
Technical 
capacity is in 
place. 
The Oil Fund is 
already 
established. 
Additional 
capacity and 
costs will be 
needed to set 
up a nation-wide 
database and 
hold a 
referendum. 
Parliament’s 
overseeing 
capacities need 
improving. 
Fiscal 
decentralization 
will improve the 
amount of 
resources 
available to the 
country. 
Continual 
efforts and 
substantial aid 
is vital to help 
build up the 
technical 
capacities of 
municipalities. 
Some technical capacity is 
available (at SPPRED, 
NGO and municipality 
levels). Additional capacity 
is needed to balance 
various public preferences 
with technical or scientific 
assessments/consideratio
ns. 
Recommendations 
This list of outcome projections in relation to policy alternatives show that there is a 
major need for reform in these areas: strengthening parliamentary oversight, improving 
elections, building up the capabilities of municipalities, gradually devolving more 
responsibilities to a municipal level, and building up people’s trust in the governance 
structure. 
Directly dispensing oil revenues to citizens will promote equality and create 
incentives for citizens to hold government accountable. This alternative, however, may 
risk there being many ‘crony appointments’ in the revenue management body and the 
creation of a government-linked oligarchy. To address such risks, the political system 
overall needs to become more transparent and less corrupt. If people’s opinions are to 
be sought via referenda, the electoral system needs to be improved. A robust system 
of checks and balances is necessary to avoid a direct disbursement of oil income that 
will be used as a form of “fiscal pacification”. Parliament’s role in the management of oil 
resources needs to increase. 
A fiscal decentralisation of oil resources will improve municipalities’ financial 
resources and may thus contribute to improving services at a local level. However, 
when bearing in mind the irregularities that occur during municipal elections, there is 
high risk of a local elite usurping power and thereby mismanaging whatever resources 
are allocated from the central budget; and to avoid this risk, further reforms are needed 
to improve the capacities of municipalities, improve the electoral system here, and build 
up institutional capacity in relation to participatory decision-making at the municipal 
level. 
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Public hearings dealing with oil revenues and expenditure issues may be held at a 
municipality level and fit in with the participatory budgeting process.  
None of the policy alternatives discussed above will, however, have the desired 
effect if implemented within the current political, economic and social framework - 
though there is a policy vacuum that needs to be filled here with informed discussions 
and specific policy suggestions. There is a dearth of data and empirical evidence at the 
moment in relation to what actually exists – i.e. what the system actually is - and which 
alternative might thus be the more reliable; thus, more research is needed so that a 
really informed decision can be made. 
 
 
